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A BIOGRAPHY OF MADISON'S NOTES OF 
DEBATES 
MADISON'S HAND: REVISING THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. By Mary Sarah 
Bilder. 1 Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 2015. 
Pp. viii + 358. Hardcover, $35.00. 
1 ack Rako ve2 
No document is more important to American constitutional 
history, or even American history as a whole, than James 
Madison's notes of debates at the Federal Convention of 1787. Of 
course, one might respond that the Constitution itself, like the 
Declaration of Independence, is the highest object of intellectual 
concern. But those are only the formal texts we study, as 
authoritative statements in their own right or for their own sake. 
The questions of how those texts were written, and more to the 
point, what we know about their origins and composition: these 
are the true objects of historical study. Mary Bilder's Bancroft 
Prize-winning account of the composition, compilation, and 
revision of James Madison's notes of the debates at the Federal 
Convention of 1787 makes a landmark contribution to our 
understanding of the origins and interpretation of the 
Constitution. Hereafter, no scholar or interpreter of the original 
meaning of the text and the original intentions of its framers can 
afford to ignore the questions Bilder raises and the problems she 
identifies. What Bilder provides is a history of a primary source, 
the document that remains the preeminent source for every 
narrative and analytical history of the framing of the Constitution. 
Madison's Hand is, in a sense, a biography of a document. As 
such, viewed historically, it also has to be at least a partial 
biography of that document's author or (to use a favorite Madison 
1. Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. 
2. William Robertson Coe Professor of History and American Studies, and 
Professor of Political Science and (by courtesy) Law, Stanford University. 
317 
318 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 31:317 
term) its "compiler.'' Madison's evolving understanding of his 
own purposes and intentions in drafting and revising the notes 
thus forms the main trajectory for Bilder's analysis. 
Madison's !land is a remarkable example not only of the 
historian's art, hut also of the historian's duty. Bilder reminds us 
of a nasty historical truth: the life of the working historian- and 
particularly the historian of the Founding era- has grown much 
easier with the massive publication of primary sources. It is nice 
and certainly convenient to assume that Max Farrand did the best 
job any scholar plausibly could when he compilled and then 
revised The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 a century 
ago, and that the value of his edition of the notes that Madison 
and other delegates kept can be taken as a given for our analysis. 
Life is much simpler if we can devote our intellectual attention to 
the substantive content of documents, rather than having to fuss 
over their provenance, paleographic properties, and all those 
other tedious details that we delegate to historical editors to 
resolve. But if the veracity of the science of history always 
depends on maintaining absolute respect for the primacy of 
primary sources, scholars cannot evade their professional, even 
moral, duty to think critically about the defining characteristics of 
the individual documents on which they rely. 
In many cases, of course, this challenge is not so great. If we 
have only one copy of a text-say the recipient's copy of a 
personal letter, with no draft or letterbook copy of the original to 
compare it to-we need not agonize very much. But the 
compilation of Madison's notes of the debates at Philadelphia, 
from his original shorthand notation down through the process of 
drafting and subsequent revision, was manifestly not a simple 
process. As Bilder repeatedly reminds us, the interpretive and 
explanatory authority that scholars ascribe to these notes must be 
a function of understanding exactly how they took shape over the 
years. She is not, in fact, a great admirer of ~vfax Farrand's 
editorial work. She relies far more on the earlier Documentary 
History of the Constitution, prepared under the imprimatur of the 
Department of State, which appeared a few years before 
Farrand's Records; this "remains the most accurate transcription" 
of Madison's notes (pp. 237-38). But in the end there can be no 
substitute for the literally painstaking project of examining the 
notes, page by page, slip by slip, correction by correction, 
interlineation by deletion, to derive the best portrait possible of 
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how Madison's testament gained its final form. In effect, Bilder 
implicitly reminds constitutional historians- and also scholars 
and commentators drawn from other fields- that we all have to 
think like archeologists, recalling that no judgment about an 
artifact from the past can be reached without gaining some critical 
assessment of its provenance.3 
Bilder explains her method in a twenty-page appendix, "The 
Evidence," which immediately follows her conclusion, and which 
describes her two major approaches to the notes. The first 
involves characterizing the different sets of manuscripts that 
constitute the relevant archive in the Library of Congress: 
Madison's memorandum on the Vices of the Political System of 
the United States; sub-sets of documents within the corpus of 
Madison's notes that appear to have been prepared at different 
times, including the "unconformity" of notes for the period 
August 22-September 17, 1787, which Bilder argues were most 
likely drafted in the fall of 1789; Madison's Journal Copy of the 
official records kept by William Jackson, the Convention's 
secretary, which was probably also compiled in the fall of 1789; 
and the copy of Madison's notes prepared for Thomas Jefferson 
by his future son-in-law, John Wayles Eppes. Her second 
approach involves using the variety of watermarks found on these 
documents to attempt to date, on a daily sheet-by-sheet basis, the 
notes of debates and a handful of Madison letters. 
Given the highly technical nature of this analysis, it is 
unsurprising that "The Evidence" appears as an appendix. One 
suspects that Bilder's editors at Harvard University Press insisted 
on that approach, for all the obvious reasons. Even so, readers 
who want to grasp the nuances of Bilder's argument should read 
"The Evidence" first because that will simplify their 
understanding of her methodology ab initio. What is far less 
excusable, in a book of this nature, is to have to go back and forth 
from text to endnotes to see how particular claims are sustained. 
Again, we all know why editors prefer endnotes over footnotes; 
but sometimes that preference is completely ill-advised. This is 
manifestly one such occasion. 
]. Of course, "semantic" or "puhlic meaning" originalists will prohahly dispute this 
claim, since they have relatively little concern with the evidentiary value of the records of 
the Federal Convention or the legislative history of the adoption of the Constitution. 
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Scrupulous readers need to keep these strictures in mind to 
derive maximum advantage from this provocative book. The basic 
narrative structure of Madison's 11 and follows a simple linear 
model. Bilder begins in the early 1780s, when Madison entered 
the Continental Congress, and then moves steadily forward in 
time, through his preparations for Philadelphia, successive stages 
of the Convention, the early post-1787 revisions, the later 
revisions of the 1790s, and then, following the hiatus of his sixteen 
years as Secretary of State and President, his two-decade 
retirement at Montpelier. But if her narrative thread remains 
chronological, the analytical structure is much more complicated. 
One constantly has to recall that the finished notes were the result 
of revisions done at different times. Moreover, it is equally 
important to perceive that, in Bilder's view, the compilation and 
revision of the notes were always-always-a work in progress. 
The determinants of that progress did not derive, she argues, from 
Madison's desire to produce the most objective account possible. 
They flowed instead from a complex and dynamic :set of political 
considerations, some linked to his original goals at Philadelphia, 
some to the adjustments he had to make there, so1ne to the new 
ideas that evolved over the course of debate, and others to the 
new priorities that emerged in the 1790s, especially through his 
close association with Thomas Jefferson, who was either the dark 
star redirecting Madison's political genius or the crucial ally with 
whom he pursued their joint goals. Many of Madison's 
observations and revisions would appeal to someone who already 
understood the nuances of political maneuvering within 
deliberative bodies-someone, that is, like Jefferson, whom 
Bilder repeatedly insists was Madison's original audience.4 
The point of Bilder's analysis, then, is not to do yet again 
what every other author writing on this subject has done, to use 
Madison's notes to retell the story of the Convention, but rather 
to use its deliberations and decisions to tell the story of Madison's 
notes. Her goal is to identify when, where, how, and why the notes 
took their form. This involves thinking about both their original 
composition and their subsequent revision. It requires viewing the 
notes kept by other delegates, not as partial (or even partisan) 
versions of Madison's fuller, more conscientious account, but as 
4. Or as Bilder puts it, while commenting on events laking place after the rejection 
of the New Jersey Plan: "'The knowledge that the future reader was an astute politician 
underlay accounts of procedural strategies" (p. 97). 
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checkpoints of his own documentary thoroughness, political 
preferences, and perhaps most important (and troubling, but this 
is what historians have to do) his honesty. The way in which 
Madison later integrated the convention journal's account of 
motions and votes into his notes is also vital, for it helps to explain 
how, over time, his initial preference for making the notes an 
account of the political maneuvers within the convention became 
more of an official record of its deliberations. That change in 
emphasis reflected, Bilder argues, a shift in Madison's 
understanding of his own role as a delegate, as he became 
increasingly engaged with the textual details of Continental 
Congress's decisions. Over the long run, as Madison understood 
that the publication of his notes after his death would be his true 
testamentary legacy, he must have intended his literary emphasis 
on the "moderation of emotion" in 1787 to remind a nation just 
riven by the Nullification controversy of 1832-33 of the 
tremendous seriousness of the Framers' accomplishments. Here 
we (or at least this reviewer, perhaps more than Bilder) would 
have us recall the powerful lesson of Federalist 49- a text written, 
politely but firmly, against Jefferson's authority, and in a proto-
Burkean key- of the value to a polity of maintaining "that 
veneration which time bestows on every thing, and without which 
perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the 
requisite stability." 
To make her case, Bilder necessarily develops a number of 
interpretive hypotheses of her own. These interpretations range 
from the plausible to the persuasive, and from the provocative to 
the problematic. There is a lot to argue about and with in this 
book, beyond its painstaking efforts to reconstruct how the notes 
evolved. Later I will identify some of my major qualms and 
reservations. But first Bilder's account deserves its fair summary. 
Bilder opens her first substantive chapter, "The Genre of 
Legislative Diaries," with her central hypothesis: ''The Notes of 
the Constitutional Convention were not initially written for 
posterity. They were composed for Madison's use with the intent 
to be shared with Thomas Jefferson" (p. 19). The notes from 1787 
were a continuation of a practice Madison had begun in 1782-83, 
when he kept a "legislative diary" as a member of the Continental 
Congress. The idea of keeping such a diary had a number of 
expedient uses. "Writing was a way of thinking for Madison," 
Bilder continues. "His diary focused on his political commitments, 
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strategies, and conflicts,'' including the divisions within the 
Virginia congressional delegation driven by the presence of 
Arthur Lee, the youngest and most obnoxious of the Lee family 
brothers (p. 19). Over time, the desire to share political 
"intelligence'' with Jefferson also became an important factor. 
Jefferson had done something similar at Congress back in 1776, 
when he prepared a collective summary of the debates over 
independence and a more diary-like, speaker-by-speaker account 
of the discussion of the Articles of Confederation drafted by a 
committee chaired by John Dickinson. Jefferson gave Madison a 
copy of these notes in 1783, and Madison in return gave Jefferson 
access to his own notes of recent debates in Congress, when the 
dominant issue was the completion of a new plan of national 
revenue.5 
In his preparations for the Federal Convention, Madison also 
drafted "working notes," the subject of Bilder's second chapter. 
These included his reading notes on "Ancient & Modern 
Confederacies," and more famously, the twelve-item 
memorandum on the "Vices of the Political System of the U. 
States," which was largely drafted at New York City in the early 
spring of 1787, but arguably not completed until smne later point. 
These documents, along with several of Madison's letters, offer 
compelling evidence for the leading role he intended to play at 
Philadelphia. How that role evolved is the subject of Parts II and 
III ( chs. 3-6), which form the evidentiary core of Madison's Hand. 
The composition of the notes of debate at the convention was 
something of a literary experiment. At the start, Madison may 
have merely thought that the notes would provide a basis for 
political correspondence- the sharing of intelligence- with 
trusted friends. But that possibility ended when the Convention 
voted to keep its deliberations confidential. Madison developed a 
5. It is worth noting, howL:vcr, that the editors of The Papers of James Madison 
suggest that hL: prepared his notes of uchatcs in 17X2 and 17X3 with history in mind. That 
was the period, after all, when the Continental Congress was engaged in rather suhstantivc 
discussions over the revenue program prepared hy its superintendent on finance, Rohcrt 
Morris. Madison personally played a critical role in the politics of this controversy, as diu 
Alexander Hamilton and James Wilson, among others. Madison had served in Congress 
for two and a half years heforc hL: started keeping a legislative diary in this way, so one 
might suppose that the significance of the event itself also mattered to him. See Editorial 
headnote to Notes of f)ehates in ConRress, in 5 The PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 231 
(William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal cos., 1%2). On Madison's role in the 
dchatcs over the revenue program, sec JACK RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL 
POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 307-24 (197lJ). 
2016] BOOK REVIEW 323 
style that emphasized the use of a summary statement of 
purpose-a topic sentence-to begin each individual speech. He 
worked from rough shorthand notes compiled in the assembly 
room at Independence Hall that he later converted, probably 
twice a week, into a more polished account of what had been said. 
He was not overly scrupulous about getting the exact text of 
motions, nor of recording every proposal. His judgment of what 
did and did not matter reflected his own political preferences, 
rather than an objective reporter's desire to get everything right. 
Bilder assigns an emotional edge to some of Madison's comments, 
detecting "annoyance," "exasperation,'' and ··apparent 
frustration'' and an array of other emotions with particular notes 
that other modern readers might interpret more neutrally (p. 49). 
At times I felt Bilder needed a section that she could title, 
"Madison on Emoticons.''h Yet Bilder also suggests, after 
comparing his notes with those taken by other delegates, that 
''Madison toned down the emotional tenor of speakers," making 
them sound more "moderate and reasonable," and more 
intellectually consistent, than they actually had been (pp. 63-64 ). 
Nor was Madison at his best form in capturing his own remarks. 
He "was an unreliable narrator about himself," treating "himself 
as if he were a stranger" and making himself sound ''more 
tentative than other note takers recorded'' (pp. 67-68). This was 
especially important in Madison's remarks on executive power. 
As Bilder reads Madison's speeches, they provide 
importance evidence not only of his original priorities but also of 
"his significant talent for intellectual revision and creative 
thinking" (p. 74). This seems especially apt to her discussion of 
the speeches Madison recorded himself giving on 1 une 4, when 
the subject was the joint executive-judicial council of revision, and 
June 6, when the delegates debated the election of the lower 
house of the legislature. Determining exactly what Madison said 
6. Consider this sentence from Madison's notes for May 25, the first day of business, 
when the Convention made Washington its president. His only potential rival would have 
heen Benjamin Franklin. "The Doc'. was himself to have made the nomination ofthe Gen1• 
hut the season of of ]sic] the rain did not permit him to venture to the Convention 
chamber." In Bildcr's reading, here "Madison focused on the waning of Franklin's 
influence," and even "implied almost cattily that Franklin had chosen not to appear" (pp. 
53-54). Perhaps I am obtuse, or mayhe this is a guy thing, hut I just don't get the "cattily" 
reference. For a rather different portrait of Madison's views of Franklin, sec RALPH 
KE'T"CHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 191-92 (1971). The double ·'of" in the 
sentence is based on the reading provided in the Documentary History of the Constitution 
(p. 2X2 n. 13). 
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on these two days is a question that has long puzzled scholars, not 
least because of the discrepancies between Madison's account and 
the notes of other delegates. Without rehearsing all her analytical 
details, which are complex, Bilder makes a strong case that 
Madison later transferred material from the earlier speech on the 
council of revision into the later speech on the lower house. In its 
final form, the argument of June 6 sounds very close to the famous 
theory of faction propounded in Federalist 10, namely that a 
diversity of interests operating outside of government would 
provide its own checks against the dangers of faction, independent 
of any institutional structures. Bilder is skeptical that Madison 
would have made that argument in early June. Instead, she thinks 
that the problems Madison faced in putting the best possible face 
on his remarks were reflective of the rethinking he was doing in 
the course of debate (pp. 70-74).7 The idea of relying on interests 
themselves to counteract faction was a concept that he was only 
starting to develop, not a prior discovery or hypothesis that was 
already driving his political thinking. 
Other issues made Madison distinctly uncomfortable. Some 
of his later revisions likely disguised the depth of his original 
opposition to any recognition of the reserved sovereignty of the 
states, or his willingness to create a small senate in which 
individual states would not be represented, or his discomfort with 
the issue of slavery. Bilder tellingly describes the debate of June 
11, when the Convention discussed the three-fifths clause. Four 
other delegates recorded Elbridge Gerry's rejection of the idea 
that property- especially in the form of slaves- should have any 
role in representation. Madison originally omitted any reference 
to Gerry's speech; only later, after Robert Yates's notes were 
published in 1821, did he add a version of Gerry's remarks to his 
notes. Even then, however, Madison omitted any reference to the 
fact that he himself had originally answered Gerry directly (pp. 
81-83, 227-28). 
This discomfort increased during the four weeks preceding 
the decision of July 16 giving each state an equal vote in the 
Senate. Although Madison's notes still "moderated the emotion" 
7. The argument for the council of revision rested on the premise that a joint 
executive-judicial negative on legislation would he hendicial, even necessary, at the 
national level of government, thus conceding that the existence of a multiplicity of interests 
in society at large would not hy itself form an adequate remedy against improper 
legislation. 
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with which other delegates spoke, his "distress, however, was 
apparent" (p. 104). As the small states refused to buckle on the 
issue of representation, Madison introduced the question of 
slavery as a superior way to identify the real conflict of interests 
that would require accommodation. He first appeared to raise 
that issue in a speech of June 30, when "he contended that the 
States were divided into different interests not by their difference 
of size, but by other circumstances; the most material of which 
resulted partly from climate, but principally from <the effects of> 
their having or not having slaves. ''x Bilder questions, however, 
whether Madison actually offered this trenchant statement in his 
speech of June 30. Other delegates citing this speech made no 
mention of this obviously consequential observation. It is more 
likely, she condudes, that Madison was alluding to "his 
developing thoughts," anticipating concerns he only explicitly 
voiced on July 9, when the convention was discussing the initial 
apportionment of representatives in the lower house (pp. 108-
09).l) 
Madison's mounting "dismay'' and "frustration" culminated 
in the narrow decision of July 16, giving the states an equal vote 
in the Senate, and the caucus the large-state delegates conducted 
the next day, which "was wasted," he noted, "in vague 
conversation on the subject, without any specific proposition or 
agreement" on what to do next (p. 111-12). Madison used his 
notes ''to allocate blame" and to write "sarcastically'' about the 
irresolution of his allies, whom he "mocked'' (p. 112-13). In mid-
July 1787 Madison was an embittered, disappointed 
constitutionalist. He was so ''intellectually stuck" over the failure 
of his arguments that his notes manifestly failed to do justice to 
the significant developments that took place as the convention 
returned to its agenda (pp. 111-15). 
Yet as the Convention did move forward, Madison began 
''acquiring a new role'' (the title of Chapter 6) in its deliberations. 
That new role extended, in the first place, to a much more 
engaged involvement on his part in the actual drafting- the 
X. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 17X7 4X6-X7 (Max Ferrand, 
cd., 1911 ). The hrackctcd phrase was a later insertion hy Madison. 
l). It is important to note, however, that Madison's notes for June 30 were not 
written on the replacement sheets he eventually used for J unc 21, 23, 26, and 29 (pp. 245-
46, 259). For my own thoughts on the significance of this speech, sec JACK RAKOVE, 
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKIN(i OF TilE CONSTITUTION 6X-
69 (1990) !hereinafter, RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGSj. 
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textual refinement- of the Constitution. That process started on 
August 6, with the report of the committee of detail that 
converted the resolutions adopted by July 26 into the working text 
of a complete constitution. Madison was not a member of that 
committee. Indeed, because he was so active and militant an 
advocate before mid-July, his colleagues had not elected him to 
other committees. But in August Madison got deeply engaged in 
the technical drafting of the Constitution, serving on the critical 
committees that helped bring the work of the Convention to its 
close. 
In Bilder's view, this commitment to the text led Madison to 
take a second breath in his approach to constitution rnaking. His 
notes, in whatever form they now were, gave him useful 
advantages in the final phases of drafting. Equally important, 
Madison grew less interested in polishing whatever notes he was 
still taking. His "notetaking became increasingly disjointed and 
uneven" (p. 122). His notes were much rougher than "the 
relatively polished style'' he had developed in June and July, and 
often less "attentive to procedural issues" (pp. 122-23). Instead, 
Madison found "a new interest" in his "fascination with the 
drafting process" and "a talent for working out semantic 
compromises that sidestepped theoretical disputes''' (p. 127). 
Nevertheless, there was one sense in which Madison the 
theorist was hardly asleep. "While writing, he was thinking"- and 
indeed thinking about the ways in which his colleagues were 
"making arguments that resonated with ideas that scholars have 
long associated with Madison" (p. 117). Was he responding to 
these speeches because they echoed conclusions he had already 
reached, or because, "in the process of recording" he began to 
"revise and absorb them as his own?" (p. 117). Bilder strongly 
hints-argues would be too strong a term-that Gouverneur 
Morris was influential in this respect. In particular, she suggests 
that Morris may have contributed to the formation of the central 
Madisonian theory of faction, in terms that he had not fully 
developed (or perhaps not developed at all) in the spring of 1787 
(pp. 105, 117). 
The culmination of this marked shift in Madison's 
commitments came at the end of the third week of August. After 
August 21, Madison's notetaking fell into a state of near 
"collapse" (p. 141 ). There were multiple explanations for this. 
Illness played one role- Madison suffered one of his undiagnosed 
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indispositions. But it also mattered that much of the real work of 
the Convention was now done in committee, three of which 
numbered Madison among their members. He was probably still 
taking rough notes whenever he could, but these may have been 
less than reliable sources that later left Madison uncertain what 
had been said. In Hilder's words, borrowing a term from geology, 
there is "an unconforn1ity- a missing section of time" in the notes 
(p. 141 ). Two years would pass before l\1adison would return to 
composing his account of the final weeks of the Convention, and 
when he did, the weaknesses of his sources and the uncertainties 
of memory greatly complicated his efforts. 
Hilder's portrait of Madison in the period after the 
adjournment of the Convention rests on a complex array of 
considerations. As his early letters indicate- notably including 
the pre-adjournment September 6 letter to Jefferson- he was not 
a happy camper when he left Philadelphia to return to Congress. 
But as Madison became actively involved in the ratification 
campaign, his ''personal disappointments and grievances were 
irrelevant" (pp. 158-59). And so, in many ways, were his notes. 
Some of the arguments he made in The Federalist echoed points 
made in the debates, but overall these "essays were products of 
Madison's mind after the Convention" (p. lf12). His notes were of 
little use because the debates had not anticipated the interpretive 
and rhetorical problems that the Federalists were now 
confronting. There was also a tension between the explanation of 
the inherent difficulties of constitution making that Madison 
described so well in Federalist 37- "his finest contribution" to the 
series, Bilder rightly notes (p. 160), a meditation that was 
grounded in the lived experience of constitution making- and the 
rhetorical conventions that operated during the ratification 
campaign, which descriptively "converted the complicated 
political process into the thoughts of a single mind" (pp. 160, 
164 ). 10 Yet nothing in the political debates and disputes that 
followed the adjournment of the Convention- the ratification 
campaign, his public commitment to constitutional amendments, 
the congressional debate over the removal power-led Madison 
I 0. I certainly share this assessment of Federalist 37. hut also think that Bilder 
neglects to note the way in which Madison deployed the epistemological strictures laid 
down there to such issues as federalism in Federalist 39 or the initial discussion of 
separation of powers in Federalist 47-4X. See RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS. supra note 
9, at 156-62,279-Xl. 
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to privilege its authority. Madison "embraced a robust method of 
interpretation- spirit, principles, structure, text- with a 
pragmatic desire to make the government function'' (p. 176 ). 
Madison appears to have returned to the task of completing 
and revising his notes in the early fall of 1789, just after the 
adjournment of the first session of the First Congress. Most likely 
he borrowed the official Convention journals from George 
Washington, who had become their official keeper. Madison may 
have originally intended to use the journal to fill in gaps in his own 
notes, particularly for the convention's concluding weeks. But in 
the end, and probably fairly quickly, he copied the entire record 
(p. 182). After this point, in Bilder's view, Madison began revising 
his notes much more comprehensively. There is no simple way in 
a book review such as this to catalogue the numerous revisions 
and changes Madison made, or to date them with a high degree of 
confidence. Relying both on her examination of the manuscripts 
in the Library of Congress and her extremely careful use of The 
Documentary His tory of the Constitution (again, as an alternative 
to Farrand's Records), Bilder surveys the kinds of changes 
Madison made. 
She does draw one major conclusion about the general tenor 
of his revisions. The legislative diary of 1787, with its expedient 
political uses, "had vanished," Bilder observes. In its place, 
The revisions demonstrate Madison's desire to convert the 
Notes to resemble printed debates. As Madison revised, his 
small changes, often seemingly innocuous, reduced the 
confusions, ambiguities, and uncertainties of the summer of 
1787. In creating an illusion of consistency, the Notes 
composed in the summer of 1787 were gradually lost (p. 198). 
Madison was "replacing [the legislative diary foundations] with a 
veneer of legislative debates," adopting "a tone (measured, 
cautious, precise) and a voice (objective and detached)" that 
revealed a new assumption in part: "that Madison initially 
assumed the revised manuscript would be read" (p. 192). 
As Bilder describes the different kinds of changes Madison 
made in 1789- and caveat lector, the previous paragraphs of this 
review do not do justice to the complexity of her description of 
that process- Bilder periodically reminds us of Jefferson's 
presence, or rather, his absence. Had Jefferson returned to the 
United States sooner, she observes, the notes might have retained 
their original form. Bilder speculates that Madison had his own 
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motives for not explaining to Jefferson precisely how and when 
the notes were compiled. Perhaps, she seems to suggest, Madison 
wanted Jefferson to think that the notes were largely completed 
by September 1787 (pp. 183-84). 
Of course, Jefferson did finally return to the United States 
late in 1789, and soon agreed to accept Washington's nomination 
to serve as Secretary of State, rather than return to France. That 
was the duty Madison pressed upon him as soon as he and Dolley 
visited the great sage of Monticello just after Christmas. Their 
active political collaboration in the 1790s provides the basis for 
Bilder's most dramatic chapter, on ''The Influence of Mr. 
Jefferson" on the continuing revision of the notes (pp. 202-22). 
Jefferson was sufficiently interested in the notes to recruit his 
nephew, John Francis Eppes, to make a copy of them in the fall 
of 1790. The existence of that copy, which is deposited in the 
Massachusetts Historical Society, thus provides another 
checkpoint to mark the course and progress of the revisions. 
Beyond that technical argument, however, Bilder has a more 
provocative case to make about the Madison-Jefferson relation 
and the revision of the notes. Although the two men agreed on 
most points of constitutional interpretation, they did not think 
about the Constitution in entirely similar ways. Bilder's Jefferson 
does not think about the Constitution all that much. Having spent 
the spring and summer of 1787 wandering around France and 
fretting over his liaison with Maria Cosway, Jefferson lacked the 
proprietorial sense of involvement with the Convention and 
Constitution that Madison ineluctably felt. 11 But the difference in 
their views was a function of something greater than the gap 
distinguishing personal involvement from distant observation. 
''Jefferson was uninterested in the Constitution," Bilder notes. He 
doubted whether its authority supplanted other claims that could 
rest either on natural right or even "the pre-1787 constitutional 
structure with which he was familiar"(p. 204). His interest in the 
notes, she suggests, was particularistic, tied to debates on specific 
points, like the February 1791 dispute over congressional 
authority to incorporate a national bank. 
11. For some further rdkctions on this subject, sec JACK RAKOVE, 
REVOLUTIONARIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THF INVENTION OF AMERICA 330-40 (2010) 
!hereinafter, RAKOVE, REVOLl!TIONARil:SI. For what it's worth (perhaps not very much), 
I think he was in love with her. 
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Bilder is also unconvinced that Jefferson ever :read the notes 
in their entirety, or regarded them as the basis of a coherent 
narrative of how the Constitution was framed. Madison may well 
have shared those doubts. When he resisted Jefferson's 
suggestion that the notes should indeed be published, Madison 
seemed to suppose that Jefferson still did not know everything 
they contained. Publication would do no harm to Jefferson's 
reputation, after all. Indeed, Bilder argues, ''Jefferson no longer 
was a political leader who had failed to participate in the 
founding; he was the only one untainted by it'' (p. 214). Madison's 
situation by the late 1790s was obviously different (pp. 221-22, 
214). 12 
More important, as party conflict sharpened in the 1790s, 
Jefferson did find one key element in the history of the 
Convention that animated, even dominated, his political agenda. 
This was the evidence that Madison's notes shed on the opinions 
and behavior of their joint "nemesis," Alexander Hamilton. 
Convinced that Hamilton was both an "Angloman" and a 
monarchist, Jefferson relished those moments when the Secretary 
of the Treasury had disclosed his true colors. Jefferson's reading 
of the Convention notes on this point were complemented by the 
political note-taking he began in 1792, when he started compiling 
the memoranda, later revised, that he called the Anas. Bilder 
hedges in judging how important Madison's notes were in shaping 
Jefferson's opinions of Hamilton. That was doubtless a process 
whose results were over-determined. Giving the name of 
Republican to their emerging political opposition to Hamilton's 
program was no mere matter of rhetorical convenience, Bilder 
suggests, for Jefferson believed that Hamilton was bent on 
subverting true republicanism in the interest of his monarchical 
preferences. 
12. By "founding,'' Hilder m<.:ans the adoption of the Constitution; Jefferson has 
always hccn a Founder hut could never he a Framer. Hilder docs not pursue this point, hut 
one might illustrate this in terms of Madison's and Jefferson's complementary yet not 
wholly identical understandings of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions they 
respectively authored. Madison regarded the Virginia Resolutions primarily as a statement 
of the residual right or a state legislature to mohilizc political oppo:,ition to measures it 
deemed unconstitutional. Jefferson's Kentucky Resolutions at least flirted with the idea of 
nullification. In a not atypical letter in the history of their correspondence, Madison 
reminded Jefferson or this distinction. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas 
Jefferson (Dec. 29, l79X), in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 191, 191-92 (David B. 
Mattern ct al. cds., 1991 ). 
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Washington thought this opinion was absurd, but Madison 
joined Jefferson in these convictions. That commitment, however, 
created some distinct problems for Madison in terms of some 
speeches he had given at the Convention that seemed to have a 
decidedly Hamiltonian cast. Bilder identifies five sheets of paper 
that, she hypothesizes, replaced Madison's earlier notes. These 
speeches recorded Madison's thoughts on such topics as the 
dangers that the states posed to effective national governance; the 
need to promote fit characters to higher office; the role of the 
Senate in protecting n1inority rights; and the importance of having 
an independent executive who might even hold office on the 
tenure of good behavior. Knowing that other delegates had kept 
notes of these speeches, Madison could not wholly disguise or 
blatantly distort what he had said. But he could reshape these 
speeches to give them a more republican cast, and one that would 
better align what he had said at Philadelphia with 1 efferson 's 
positions in the 1790s (pp. 214-18). n 
Bilder is very careful not to overstate her conclusions. She 
identifies problems that need to be considered, possible 
explanations that should be explored, and technical problems that 
could require further analysis and evaluation. Arguably she could 
have been more assertive and robust in her arguments and 
conclusions, but because this is first and foremost a work of 
historical, not doctrinal, analysis, she rightly allows the historian's 
side of her law-and-history training to prevail. The consistent 
argument she sustains throughout her book is that an array of 
political considerations always governed the compilation and 
revision of Madison's notes. In some general way, those concerns 
were still operating even during the two decades of his retirement 
(1817-1836), when he could have completed the task instead of 
endlessly tinkering with small revisions. In the end, publication 
came posthumously. "Madison never asserted in his own hand 
that the Notes were contemporaneous" with the Convention (p. 
239). They were a complex document that had a complicated life 
of its own, and Bilder's book is now its standard biography. 
Yet if Madison's Hand is thus a biography of the notes of 
debate, it must also make an important contribution to Madison's 
biography, in several respects. Bilder's account rests on certain 
well-defined assumptions about Madison's commitments and 
13. "The Evidence" appendix discusses the replacement sheets (pp. 245-46). 
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character, about the evolution of his political ideas, and especially 
about his relationship with Jefferson. In the remainder of this 
review, I will express some qualms, concerns, and reservations 
about those assumptions and impressions. 
The lessons of history. From the start of her analysis, Bilder 
seems skeptical about the idea that Madison conceived the notes 
as a contribution to the historical record. Consider, again, the 
opening sentences of her first chapter: '"The Notes of the 
Constitutional Convention were not initially written for posterity. 
They were composed for Madison's use with the intent to be 
shared with Thomas Jefferson" (p. 19). As a matter both of logic 
and evidence, this is a problematic statement. There is no binary 
imperative requiring the notes to have been written, as Bilder 
implies, either for history or simply as a ''legislative diary" shaped 
by a set of political preferences. From the outset, the notes could 
have been written with multiple ends in mind. This proposition 
matters, not only because it relates to Bilder's n1ain argument 
about the evolution of the notes over time, but because it is also 
relevant to her discussion of Madison's political thinking. 
The late Judith Shklar (whom I was fortunate enough to 
know in graduate school) once made a particularly insightful 
remark about Madison: 
He had a historian's mind, which was a great intellectual 
advantage. It enabled him to penetrate to the logic of collective 
action, even when on the surface there seemed to be nothing 
but random irrationality and partisan wrangling. By reflecting 
upon previous occasions and experiences he was alwals able to 
sec a pattern amid the confusion of men and events. 1 
That "'historian's mind" was evident in multiple facets of 
Madison's political and intellectual personality. Some of it 
reflected his experience, including his first involvement in public 
affairs as an Orange County delegate to the Fifth Provincial 
Convention of 1776 that drafted Virginia's new constitution. Like 
other participants in those deliberations, Madison understood the 
historical novelty of the constitution-making experience. More 
important, Madison constructed the constitutional problems 
Americans needed to reconsider by thinking critically-that is, 
14. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, Redeeminf.i American Political Theory, in REDEEMING 
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 91,96 (Stanley Hoffmann & Dennis F. Thompson, eds., 
199H). One larger theme of this Essay is the contrast hctween Madison's fondness for 
thinking historically ami Jefferson's indifference to the evidence of the past. 
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historically- about the flawed or mistaken assumptions of the 
mid-1770s. The lack of attention that the early constitution writers 
of 1776 had given to the need to establish properly bicameral 
legislatures, he wrote Caleb Wallace in 1785, reflected the natural 
emphasis the colonists had long given to "the administration of 
power" by imperial authorities. 15 He struck a similar note in the 
critical seventh item of the Vices of the Political System of the 
United States, when he asked why the Articles of Confederation 
neglected to give the Continental Congress coercive authority 
over the states. Again, the inexperience of its ''compilers" and 
their republican assumptions, which were so reasonable for 1776-
1777, that the state legislatures would do the right thing, helped 
to account for their "mistaken confidence." 10 
An interest in the lessons of history was also evident in the 
famous course of reading that Madison undertook- in the 
isolated stillness of Montpelier, where the room that was likely 
Madison's study gazed directly west to the Blue Ridge- on the 
subject of ancient and modern confederacies. How much 
satisfaction Madison took from this academic exercise is difficult 
to tell. A passing remark he made three decades later indicates 
some frustration with the process: "The infant periods of most 
nations are buried in silence, or veiled in fable,'' he wrote William 
Eustis, "and perhaps the world may have lost but little which it 
need regret." But that regret would not color the history of the 
Founding of the American republic. "The origin and outset of the 
American Republic contain lessons of which posterity ought not 
to be deprived," Madison continued, ''and, happily, there never 
was a case in which a knowledge of every interesting incident 
could be so accurately preserved.'' 17 
Madison made a similar observation in his historical 
memorandum, "A Sketch Never Finished Nor Applied," which 
offered a brief survey of the origins of the federal union and 
15. LL:ttL:r from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 17X5), in X THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON 350, 350-51 (Robert A. Rutland & William M. E. Rachal cos., I ()73). 
1o. JAMES MADISON, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in ()THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 345, 351 (Robert A. Rutland & William M. E. Rachal eus., 
1 ()75) 
17. Letter from James Madison to William Eustis (July o, IX!()) in 3 LETTERS AND 
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 140 ( !Xo5). I have some partiality lor the first 
sentence of this quotation, which I used to open the first chapter of RAKOVE. ORIGINAL 
MEANINGS, supra note(), at 3. Even so, it seems to me to captun; a key facet of Madison's 
understanding of "the American history." 
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Constitution- and also of Madison's notes at Philadelphia. The 
exact dating of the composition of this document is unknown, but 
it was obviously written late in Madison's life, when feebleness 
marooned him on the ground floor at Montpelier. Bilder reprints 
the two famous paragraphs of the ''Sketch'' in which Madison 
described how he physically set out to take comprehensive notes 
of the debates. Again, she notes a key point that all those scholars 
(like myself) who have not consulted the relevant manuscript 
would miss: that midway through this passage, "Madison's 
handwriting trails off as he explains when he rewrote the rough 
notes taken during the Convention." Dolley finished that 
sentence and wrote the next paragraph. Other editors (Gaillard 
Hunt) assume that Madison dictated what Dolley wrote, but 
Bilder leaves the question open. "Perhaps he did; perhaps not." 
Here again, playing the role of scholarly provocatrice, Bilder 
implies that maybe Dolley Did It-that she made conclusive a 
point on which her husband hedged. "Madison may have 
consented to this addition to his draft,'' she writes, "and then 
again, who knows, perhaps on his deathbed he paused, unable to 
bring himself to swear to posterity that the Notes had been written 
in the summer of 1787. "(p. 239; cj: 335 nn. 48-49). 1s 
But Bilder neglects to discuss the preceding paragraph in 
which Madison reflected in much broader terms about his 
purposes. Here his comments expanded the pithy sentiment 
expressed in his 1819 letter to Eustis. Madison alluded both to the 
"curiosity" he had felt during his "researches" into the histories 
of confederacies, especially those of antiquity, and '·'the deficiency 
I found in the means of satisfying it more especially in what 
related to the process, the principles, the reasons, & the 
anticipations, which prevailed in the formation of them" as the 
animating concern that inclined him to keep a record of the 
debates. Perhaps this explanation of his motive was merely some 
ex post justification or rationalization for the conversion of the 
''legislative diary" into something else, but I doubt it. 
Of course, Bilder's telling examination of the compilation, 
composition, and revision of Madison's notes also :instructs us not 
1 K If we want to dahhk in the free usc of "perhaps," Bildcr should perhaps interject 
"without a rcasonahk douht" as her plausihk threshold of historical veracity, though that 
would hardly accord with speculative passages elsewhere in the hook. This page offers 
another confirmation of the annoyance scholarly readers will feel over having to go hack 
and forth from text to endnotes in a work that is necessarily so technical in nature. 
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to engage in their uncritical usage. They did not create an 
unbiased or completely neutral account of how the Convention 
operated or how the Constitution took shape. Nor would 
Madison's labors satisfy the standards of modern journalism or 
historical documentary editing. Yet once we concede that those 
modern standards were not met, we necessarily have to ask, which 
historical (or historicizing) goals was Madison most likely to wish 
to meet? Bilder consistently emphasizes Madison's desire or 
penchant for presenting the debates as possessing a more 
moderate or temporized inflection than the delegates originally 
expressed. His inclination to present a summary sentence at the 
start of each speech could have reflected a literary inclination on 
his part to impose more structure on the deliberations than they 
actual1y possessed. But given that there were neither useful 
precedents for the activity in which Madison was engaged, nor 
fixed historical criteria defining how these materials should be 
presented, we at least have to ask what other concerns (beyond 
Madison on Emoticons) might explain why he wanted to 
reconstruct the debates in these terms. In other words, if Madison 
was indeed writing for history, as well as for Jefferson, what 
standards and purposes might he have been applying and 
pursuing? And perhaps Madison, as a seasoned participant in 
countless collective deliberations, might have grasped that an 
account that reduced or smoothed over some of the sharper edges 
of debate might do better justice, in its own way, to its underlying 
substance. 
Jefferson as Audience. This question leads naturally to 
Bilder's second guiding hypothesis: that Madison's specific 
"intent" in drafting his legislative diary was to prepare the notes 
for Jefferson's later reading. Given the striking uses of "perhaps" 
that accompany her quizzical account of the concluding 
paragraphs of the "Sketch," it seems rather astonishing that her 
hypothesis-conclusion about the real target of the notes lacks 
documentary confirmation. It would be great if we had a Dear 
Tom letter letting the American minister to the court of Louis 
XVI know that his friend from Montpelier would ensure that the 
doings at Philadelphia would be recorded in some detail. [t would 
be equally nice to find a Dear J emmy letter asking Madison to 
compile a faithful summary of the debates. Alas, no such letters 
exist. The closest we get is a statement in Madison's letter to 
Jefferson of July lH, 1787, apologizing for "the mortification of 
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being restrained from disclosing any part of their proceedings" 
while noting that "I have taken lengthy notes of every thing that 
has yet passed, and mean to go on with the drudgery, if no 
indisposition obliges me to discontinue it." 19 Of course, there is no 
reason to doubt that Madison always imagined Jefferson as a 
future reader of the notes, whatever forn1 they took. As Bilder 
notes, exchanging political intelligence with each other was 
something the two men had long done. Yet to turn this wholly 
reasonable expectation into a specific paramount intention on 
Madison's part requires a supra-documentary leap of intellectual 
faith. Bilder's Jefferson hypothesis is simply a stipulation on her 
part- and this in a book that reminds all of us of our dependence 
on hard and verifiable historical evidence! 
Beyond that concern with the targeted audience of the notes, 
however, Madison's Hand raises a larger set of questions about 
the Jefferson-Madison relationship. That, too, is a complicated 
matter, and one that will remain a source of scholarly 
interpretation, notwithstanding its recent extensive treatment by 
Andrew Burstein and Nancy Isenberg.20 Bilder's psychological 
portrait of Madison suggests that the younger man sought the 
approval of his older friend and ally. In particular, Bilder implies 
that it was Madison's thinking that had to evolve as he drew closer 
to Jefferson's opposition to Hamilton's Anglomanic monarchism. 
The five replacement sheets (described above) were likely a 
product of this shift. Yet the question of why Madison might have 
felt compelled to gain Jefferson's approval by altering his notes in 
the 1790s remains unposed and thus unanswered. 
Madison willingly acceded to Jefferson's political seniority as 
their alliance became more active. Yet it is difficult to square this 
deferential aspect of their relationship in the 1790s with the way 
in which Madison discussed constitutional issues with Jefferson in 
the late 1780s. Madison was quite forthright in explaining his 
agenda to Jefferson in March 1787. His September 6 account of 
his disappointment with the course of the Convention is hardly 
equivocal. Seven weeks later, Madison devoted fully half of his 
seventeen-page letter summarizing the Convention to a 
l<J. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (July 1~, 17~7), in 10 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON lO.S, 10.S (Rohert A. Rutland, et al. eds., l<J77). 
20. ANDREW BURSTEIN & NANCY ISENBERG, MADISON AND JEFFERSON (2010). 
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wholehearted defense of the negative on state laws.21 After the 
ratification campaign began, Madison certainly did not welcome 
the publication of a Jefferson letter endorsing the idea that four 
states should withhold their approval of the Constitution until 
requisite amendments were adopted. Here he was, trying to get 
the Constitution ratified, and there was Jefferson, nonchalantly 
endorsing a temporary separation in the union. Over time, as their 
wonderful correspondence on a bill of rights developed, the tone 
moderated. Yet in his important letter of October 17, 17R8, 
outlining his still somewhat grudging acceptance of a bill of rights, 
Madison went to some lengths to distinguish his conclusions from 
Jefferson's. The real danger to rights, Madison observed, came 
not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its 
constituents, hut from acts in which the Government is the 
mere instrument of the major numher of the constituents. This 
is a truth of great importance, hut not yet sufficiently attended 
to: and is prohahly more strongly impressed on my mind hy 
facts, and reflections suggested hy them, than on yours which 
has contemplated ahuscs of power issuing from a different 
quarter.22 
At the same time as Madison was drafting this letter, he also wrote 
a highly critical analysis of the draft revision of the Virginia 
constitution that Jefferson had sent him five years earlier.23 
Yet Bilder never explains why the more assertive Madison of 
the 1780s would have become more eager or anxious to truckle to 
Jefferson's opinion in the 1790s. If Madison then had no fixed 
intention of publishing the notes, why would he worry about 
moderating his speeches to gain Jefferson's approval? Moreover, 
if Jefferson's eventual interest in the notes was neither deep nor 
thorough, how, absent other evidence, can Bilder infer that he was 
always its principal audience? It would take a neat romp in 
backward induction to make that argument work out. The 
personal, political, and psychological dimensions of the Madison-
21. Set' Letter from James Madison to Thomas J effcrson (Oct. 24, 17X7), in 10 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 19, at 20()~17; Letter from James Madison to 
Thomas Jefferson (Sept.(), 17X7), in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 19, 
at lfl3-M; Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 17X7), in 9 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 16, at 317-19 (including his first mention of the 
negative on state laws). 
22. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17. 17XX) in 11 THE 
PAPERS OJ, JAMES MADISON 295, 29X (Rohert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hohson cos., 1977) 
23. JAMES MADISON, Observations on .lef{erson's Drafi of a Constitution fiJr 
Virginia, in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 22, at 2Xl-94. 
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Jefferson friendship and alliance thus remain an open subject for 
exploration. 
Madison the political thinker. At different points in her book, 
Bilder reminds her readers that Madison used his legislative diary 
as a spur to his own creative political thinking. This position 
supports the one claim that Madison specialists might regard as 
her most provocative. In the conventional story that many 
scholars tell, the key insights that were ultimately published in 
Federalist 10 first appeared in the eleventh itern of the pre-
Convention memorandum on the Vices of the Political System of 
the United States.24 The most important of these was the famous 
hypothesis that the existence of a multiplicity of interests in 
society that an extended national republic would embrace would 
operate to cure the mischief of faction by discouraging the 
formation of factious majorities. In the eleventh ite1n of the Vices, 
titled "'Injustice of the laws of [the] States," Madison first 
observed that the problem of "injustice betrays a defect still more 
alarming'' than the "'multiplicity" and "mutability" of state 
legislation "because it brings more into question the fundamental 
principle of republican Government, that the majority who rule in 
such Governments, are the safest Guardians both of public Good 
and of private rights." Madison then asked, in a question that was 
not merely rhetorical: "To what causes is this evil to be ascribed?" 
and quickly identified two, one lying "in the Representative 
bodies," the other "in the people themselves." Madison dealt with 
the first set of causes fairly quickly, but the second set received a 
24. The source of this interpretation lies originally in two famous essays hy Douglass 
Adair. See DOUGLASS ADAIR, The Tenth Federalist Revisited, in FAME AND THE 
FOUNDING FATHERS: ESSAYS HY DOUGLASS ADAIR 106 (Trevor Colhourn ed., 199X); 
DOUGLASS ADAIR, "That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science": David Hume, James 
Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: ESSAYS HY 
DOUGLASS ADAIR, supra, at 132. Adair's interpretation eventually gave rise to an ongoing 
debate over the nature and extent of the influence of David Hume's writings on Madison's 
thinking, since his key premise was that Madison derived his conception of the idea of an 
extended republic as an apen;u hascd on his reading (or rereading) of Humc's political 
essays, notably the "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth." The details of that ongoing 
controversy need not concern us here, hut perhaps two not wholly consistent observations 
arc relevant. One is that Adair's explanation of Hume's influence on Madison is essentially 
suppositious, in that it lacks evidentiary confirmation. The other is that the matter of how 
the founders read Humc nevertheless remains an important question, and one that could 
he tied to the controversies of the 1790s, given H ume ·s forthright appreciation of the 
positive role that corruption-meaning the giving of offices and other devices of political 
influence-could play in maintaining political stability and a "balanced" constitution. A 
helpful counterpoint to Adair's interpretation, which also summarizes the prior debate, is 
Mark Spencer, Hume and Madison on Faction, 59 WM. & MARY 0. H69 (2002). 
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much more extended treatn1ent. Here was the first occasion on 
which he argued that, "contrary to the prevailing theory,'' an 
extended republic would be better qualified to pursue the public 
good and protect private rights than a narrower one.25 
Bilder challenges this interpretation in several extremely 
interesting respects. She suggests, first, that the Vices (which were 
listed as individual headings on the left side of the manuscript) 
were conceived as a set of Observations (the substantive 
discussions on the right side of the manuscript) that were meant 
"to have served as the basis for an opening address at the 
Convention" (p. 44). Second, and more important, Bilder 
proposes that the extended discussion of ''societal interests and 
factions" that we regard as the proto-draft of Federalist 10 "may 
have been added at a later time to the manuscript," presumably 
at the Convention itself. These observations appear on "a 
different paper" from the earlier Vices, a "paper that appears 
visually to match the paper used during the Convention." (p. 45). 
Third, Bilder hints (again, argues would be too strong a term) that 
Madison may have derived significant inspiration on this point 
from other delegates, notably Gouverneur Morris (p. 117). If she 
is right, a concern with the social sources of political conflict in the 
American republic was not a major element in Madison's thinking 
going into the Convention, but instead reflected a shift in 
emphasis that somehow arose from the deliberations at 
Philadelphia. Fourth, the opportunity (or perhaps one could say, 
the rhetorical advantage) of formulating an argument about the 
political benefits of a multiplicity of factions became compelling 
only after the discussion of the Constitution moved into its public 
phase in the early fall of 1787.26 It is crucial to her argument to 
note that Madison's familiar portrait of the diversity of interests 
operating within even republics originally led him to emphasize 
institutional solutions to the problem of faction- specifically, the 
negative on state laws and the executive-judicial council of 
25. JAMES MADISON, Vices of the Political System of the United State.\, supra note 
16, at 353-57. 
26. On this point, sec Hilder (pp. 15X-59, 2XH-X9 n.X. 30H-09, n.13), where she 
discusses the origins of THE FEDERALIST and the special relevance of an undated page of 
notes written hy Hamilton, commenting on Madison's theory, which Farrand assigned to 
the Convention debate of June 6. One hates to he an editorial kvetch on a hook whose 
argument is technically so complex, hut the material on Hamilton's notes seems so 
germane that it really belongs in the text. Hilder makes the e4ually compelling suggestion 
that Hamilton's notes could just as easily have heen written in New York while he and 
Madison were actively discussing the organization of The Federulist in October 17H7. 
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revision- rather than the reliance on the existence of multiple 
interests and factions in society at large. 
This is, to put it mildly, an extremely intriguing and 
provocative argument, and one that Madison scholars-or really, 
all scholars of the Founding-will both love and need to ponder. 
Because of its relevance to that U r-text of American 
constitutional theory, Federalist H)-whose argurnent is largely 
reprised in Ur-text number 2, Federalist 51-deciding exactly 
when and why Madison developed the theory of the extended 
republic is a non-trivial problem. Bilder's case, even in this 
tentative form, goes beyond the questions Larry Kramer raised in 
his celebrated "Madison's Audience" essay, which vigorously 
argued that few if any of the delegates at Philadelphia really 
grasped what Madison was trying to tell them.27 
Here, then, are some reservations and reflections on Bilder's 
fascinating suggestion. There is no question that Madison 
conceived the Vices as a document he could draw on at 
Philadelphia, or that he later constructed his notes to demonstrate 
that he had used his observations for major argumentative 
purposes. Nor can we doubt that other delegates heard him doing 
just that, as the notes kept by William Pierce and Rufus King-
though perhaps not Hamilton-indicate. There is, however, a 
great deal of uncertainty about how faithful Madison was to the 
outline of the memorandum on those occasions when he did rely 
upon it, notably including his speeches of June 4, June 6, and June 
13. Bilder carefully attempts to assess just what Madison did say 
on those occasions, and we will need to rely on her analyses on 
this point henceforth. 
Yet for a variety of reasons I remain skeptical about her 
larger claim about the Vices, and still prefer to see it, as I long 
have, as a working text that Madison initially prepared for his own 
intellectual purposes. It is, to my way of thinking, a wonderful 
document both to analyze and also to teach because it physically 
illustrates, not Madison's published thought, as in the case of 
Federalist 10, a text meant to persuade others, but rvladison in the 
act of thinking, where his primary audience was hirnself.2x 
27. Larry Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. fill (1999). 
2K. I will develop this distinction at greater length in a hook I am literally trying to 
complete even as I write this review: JACK RAKOVE, A POLITICIAN THINKING: THE 
CREATIVE MIND OF JAMES MADISON (forthcoming from University of Oklahoma Press). 
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Did Madison initially conceive the Vices as a potential 
speech? We do have working notes for a few of Madison's 
speeches on other occasions, and they take a form rather different 
from the Vices. These documents were much more succinct, 
typically following an outline form with very short phrases 
capturing the substantive points. 29 The item-by-item analysis in 
the Vices is much more extended. If one looks at the manuscript 
of the Vices as it is available on-line at the Library of Congress,30 
the first thing one notices is that Madison leaves significant gaps 
between all of his observations, leaving room to return later to 
develop points further. At a couple of critical points, Madison 
interjects a question. In item seven, after first discussing why the 
"compilers" of the Articles of Confederation had neglected to 
give Congress any coercive authority over the states, and what 
lessons about state compliance had been learned since, Madison 
asked, "How indeed could it be otherwise?"- that is, why would 
one expect any other result than the repeated defaulting of the 
states on their federal obligations. Again, just prior to the point in 
item eleven where Bilder proposes that the extended discussion 
of the sources of unjust factions began, Madison asked, "To what 
causes is this evil to be ascribed?" Bilder describes these questions 
as being "rhetorical" in nature (p. 45), but that judgment badly 
understates the intellectual work his answers were performing. 
The former question led Madison into what I have elsewhere 
described as a recognizably game theoretical analysis of the 
enduring defects of any system of federalism based on the 
voluntary compliance of the state legislatures with congressional 
This hook will he hased on the Julian Rothhaum lectures delivered at the l Jniversity of 
Oklahoma in 2009. 
29. See .JAMES MADISON, Dchute on Billf(Jr Relig. Fstaht proposed hy Mr. Henry, in 
X THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 15, at 197-99; JAMES MADISON, Notesf(Jr 
Dehute on Commercial Regulations hy Congress, in X THE PAPERS OF .JAMES MADISON, 
supra note 15, at 431-32; JAMES MADISON, Notes j(Jr Speech in Congress. in 12 THE 
PAPERS OF .JAMES MADISON 193 (Charles F. Hohson & Richard A. Rutland eds., 1979) 
(discussing constitutional amendments circa .June ~. 17~9); .JAMES MADISON, Notes /(Jr 
Speech in Congress, in 16 THE PAPERS OF .JAMES MADISON 269 (.J.C.A. Stagg et al. eds., 
19X9) (discussing the .Jay Treaty hetween March 23 and April 2, 1796). It may show how 
much of a Madisonian I have hecome that these texts remind me of nothing so much as my 
undergraduate lecture outlines. 
30. See Page I of.lames Madison, May 7, 17?57. Vices ofthe Political System of the U. 
Stutes, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/resourcc/mjm.02_1005 1013/'?sp=1 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2016). 
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resolutions. 31 The second question was interjected immediately 
after Madison observed that the injustice of state lawmaking was 
calling into question "the fundamental principle of republican 
Government." To call these questions rhetorical is to ignore their 
primary significance not only for Madison's theory of republican 
government but also for the construction of his constitutional 
agenda. 
There are two other reasons for doubting whether Madison 
intended the Vices as the basis for an opening speech. However 
many items comprised the original version,32 the Vices would have 
produced a truly long oration, yet one lacking a programmatic set 
of conclusions about the form of federal union and national 
government the Convention should proceed to consider. But 
second, had Madison truly wished to give the Vices as an opening 
speech, there is no obvious reason why he could not have done 
that. The Convention happily allowed the Virginians to open the 
first day of serious business, and had Governor Edmund 
Randolph indicated that Madison, with his already distinguished 
career in national and provincial politics, wished to complement 
his own opening speech, it is difficult to imagine a chorus of 
protests against it. 
Yet this still leaves open the question: did Madison come to 
perceive the basic theory of the value of a multiplicity of factions 
tied to the existence of an extended republic before the 
Convention, or at some point later? One inter-textual problem 
31. RAKOVE, RFVOLUTIONARIES, supra note 11, at 359-65; Jack Rakove, Thinkin!{ 
Like a Constitution,24.1. EARLY REPlJHLIC5-Il (2004). 
32. Drawing on a summary reference to "the internal vicisitudcs of State policy" in 
Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 17X7), in 9 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON,supra note 16, at 3X4. Bilder suggests that Madison's original list of vices 
might have numhen:d nine: four devoted to the ways in which actions hy the states 
encroached on federal policies and interests, which relate to the first four items of the 
Vices; four devoted to a "want" of some essential quality, which corresponds to items five 
through eight; and one devoted to the internal problems of the states. Breaking the last 
category down into four component clements ("multiplicity," "mutability," "injustice," 
and "impotence" of state lawmaking) would thus give the Vices, conceived as a speech, a 
''symholically evocative" quality of twelve vices arrayed symmetrically in three groups of 
four (pp. 45-46). Perhaps twelve is "symbolically evocative" in a way that nine is not-
especially prior to the modern history of hasehall (at least in the National League)- hut 
this involves applying a rhetorical form of !{l:'matria I have not yet mastered. ''Impotence" 
was the one Vice that lacked any accompanying Observation, hut as Bilder, following Eric 
Stauter, notes, its "implicit sexual connotation" could have made it "an irresistible ending" 
for a male convention (p. 4h). Or perhaps not. It is difficult to imagine the Convention 
tittering over a sexual reference at their first serious day of debate. 
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with this idea pivots on the close similarity between the 
penultimate paragraph of the eleventh item of the Vices and a 
corresponding passage in the April 16 letter to Washington. This 
is the paragraph where Madison observes that "The great 
desideratum which has not yet been found for Republican 
Governn1ents, seems to be some disinterested & dispassionate 
umpire in disputes between different passions & interests in the 
State." Here, in the letter to Washington, Madison explicitly 
refers to the negative on state laws. In item 11 of the Vices, the 
corresponding paragraph follows his long discussion of the 
benefits of using "a greater variety of interests, of pursuits, of 
passions, which check each other," but the concluding point seems 
quite similar. "In small Republics, the sovereign will ... is not 
sufficiently neutral towards the parts composing it," Madison 
wrote. But just "[a ]s a limited Monarchy tempers the evils of an 
absolute one; so an extensive Republic meliorates the 
administration of a small Republic. '' 33 Bilder maddeningly deals 
with these two passages only in an endnote, where she suggests 
that the Washington letter relates to the negative on state laws, 
while item 11 of the Vices is about the extended republic (pp. 335-
36 n.3). But that reading is not self-evident, since the conventional 
definition of meliorate, then as now, is to rnake better or improve. 
If "an extensive republic meliorates the administration of a small 
Republic," it must do so not merely by making the decisions of 
the national government more resistant to faction, but by giving 
that government some mechanism for improving the 
"administration" of affairs within ''a small Republic,'' which is 
exactly what Madison conceived the negative on state laws "in all 
cases whatsoever" would do. In any case, the striking resemblance 
between these passages in the two documents could support the 
inference that the letter was composed with the Vices sitting on 
Madison's desk in New York City in April, rather than Madison 
recalling the phrasing of the letter, which was out of his hands, at 
Philadelphia (or even back in the proto-Big Apple) two or three 
(or five) months later. 
33. See Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 32, at 3X4 
(the letter); JAMES MADISON, Vices of the Political System of' the United States. supra note 
16, at 357 (final two paragraphs of the Vices). The letter is deposited in the Papers of 
George Washington at the Lihrary of Congress, and Washington would have received it at 
Mount Vernon. 
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Madison likely had conceived the beneficial effects of a 
multiplicity of factions well before the rhetorical requirements of 
ratification led him to spell out the theory in Federalist 10 and 51. 
His commitment to religious freedom, the first great political 
cause to which he was devoted, provided adequate room for this 
conviction to take hold. As Mark Spencer notes in emphasizing 
the influence of David Hume's writings on religious toleration, 
the Virginia legislator who led the campaign against the General 
Assessment Bill of 17R4 and then secured the passage of 
Jefferson's epochal Bill for Religious Freedom knew Hume's 
arguments quite well. Hume was wholly comfortable with the idea 
that the practice of religious toleration would mneliorate civil 
peace. As Spencer suggests, Hume's historical arguments on this 
point, as well as John Locke's philosophical ideas about the 
interior nature of religious belief, were both incorporated in 
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments of 1785.34 
Perhaps, however, there is another, more situational way to 
conceive the framing and expression of Madison's ideas. He was 
both a constitutional and a political thinker, and distinguishing 
between these two modes of thinking might have its uses. 
Federalist 10 is essentially a prolegomenon to a constitutional 
theory, but not such a theory itself. It identifies a set of political 
conditions that will make it possible to regard a national 
government as remaining republican in character. It also explains, 
against the conventional wisdom (though not the wisdom of the 
Convention), why such a government will be more resistant to the 
mischiefs of faction than the corresponding governments of the 
individual states. It offers a plausible hypothesis explaining why 
the election of national legislators may produce results superior 
to those found in the states, but that is the closest Federalist 10 
gets to discussing a specifically constitutional element of 
government. Pace Douglass Adair, who saw the specter of 
Montesquieu haunting the Convention ex ante, there is little 
evidence, in Madison's notes or elsewhere, that the Framers were 
sitting around worrying about how to reconcile their agenda of 
constitutional change with the Baron's strictures on the size of 
republics or the delineation of the three branches of government. 
It was a constitution the Framers were drafting, which meant, first 
34. Spencer, supra note 24, at XlJ2-96. 
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and foremost, dividing powers between the national and state 
governments, constituting the three distinct branches of 
government, and puzzling out modes of appointment and 
election. And as Bilder notes in her appreciation for Federalist 37, 
there was nothing elegant or tidy or neat in their effort to 
distinguish the spheres of national and state power or the puzzling 
boundaries among the departments. Constitutional thinking, in 
other words, is essentially about institutions; political thinking, in 
the form of Federalist 10, became essential only when the 
Constitution itself came under public scrutiny, and when its Anti-
Federalist critics naturally invoked Montesquieu 's contrarian 
authority. 
Madison's Personality and Politics. Bilder has not set out to 
become a Madison biographer, but her approach to Madison 
obviously has a strongly biographical dimension. Hers is a 
Madison who is impassioned, argumentative, sarcastic, catty, 
embittered, furious, and forgetful; someone who was deeply 
dependent on securing Jefferson's approval, for reasons that are 
not rendered wholJy evident; and who was a public figure always 
deeply mindful of how history would remember him. The 
Enlightened rationalist who colors so many portraits of Madison 
does not wholly disappear here, but Bilder draws a much sharper 
sketch. Her accounts of particular revisions in the notes routinely 
characterize Madison's mood at the moment, to a degree that 
other scholars might find problematic. 
This perspective shapes Bilder's account in some notable 
ways. The most important of these contrasts the agenda-driven 
Madison pursuing his strategic goals in the first half of the 
Convention with the deliberator and draftsman who then became 
much more engaged by the technical challenges of drafting the 
Constitution. As Bilder herself recognizes, this shift is not really 
so surprising. One can register the index of Madison on 
Emoticons in different scales, but there has never been any doubt 
that he went to Philadelphia bearing a radical agenda of 
constitutional reform that he believed he could persuade his 
colleagues to accept.:~5 Nor is it surprising that he became more 
35. The one dissenter from this judgment is the late Forrest McDonald, who says of 
Madison, on the eve of the Convention, that "it lis I difficult to know precisely what he had 
in mind." FORREST MCDONALD, NOVlJS 0RDO SECLORlJM: Till INTI LLECTlJAL 
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 205 (19X5). However, as Gordon Wood once wrote ahout 
an earlier McDonald hook, his analysis is "often perverse, hut enlightening." WOOD, THE 
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closely involved with draftsmanship in August and September. As 
Bilder has argued in a previous article on Madison's pursuit of 
legal studies, he had formed a close interest in "the problem of 
language" as it related to law.36 Equally important, Madison's 
experience in the Virginia assembly alerted him to the need to 
have legislation properly drafted. That concern attracted him to 
the idea of the council of revision, which would act less as a check 
on the abuse of legislative power than as a device for improving 
the quality of lawmaking by allowing those responsible for its 
enforcement to participate in its framing. Another reform that 
might be "still better," he wrote Caleb Wallace in 1l785, would be 
to create standing legislative committees ''composed of a few 
select & skillful individuals" who would do the actual drafting of 
legislation.37 
The shift in role from advocate to draftsman that Bilder 
deploys to trace Madison's arc through the Convention can be 
largely explained by the actual course of deliberations. Before late 
July, the delegates understood that they were only adopting a set 
of resolutions that would operate as guidelines for a text that still 
required a great deal of elaboration and refinement. That may be 
one reason why Madison, in his early note-taking, was not overly 
scrupulous about capturing an array of proposals or n1otions. No 
one rose in shock or awe on August 6 when the committee of 
detail replaced the general resolutions describing the legislative 
powers of Congress with the proto-version of Article I, Section 8. 
What matters more, then, is to identify the specific issues or 
provisions where Madison's later revision of the notes, 
particularly when juxtaposed with the notes kept by other 
delegates, indicates that he was trying to temper, dilute, or even 
misrepresent what he had actually said. As noted earlier, the 
question of whether he suggested, on June 30, that the challenge 
in constructing a bicameral legislature was to find a mechanism 
for balancing slave and free states, rather than small and large 
states, marks a point of real interpretive significance, one that 
mattered not only to the immediate outcome of the Convention 
CREATION OF TilE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-17~7, 625 (1969). That comment holds 
here. 
36. Mary Sarah Hilder, James Madison, Law Student and Demi-Lawyer, 2~ LAw & 
HIST. REV. 3~9, 437-41 (2010). 
37. Letter of James Madison to Calch Wallace, supra note 15, at 351-52. 
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but also to the essential character of the Union over the long run. 311 
Madison's pre-Convention strategy for attaining proportional 
representation in both houses pivoted on the shrewd (if mistaken) 
intuition that such a shift would appeal to northern delegations, 
because of their region's current population superiority, and to 
southern delegations, who expected the southwestern arc of 
migration to bring their region into political parity with the 
North.3l) Perhaps (but only just perhaps) the idea of keying the 
formula for allocating representation in both houses to the 
presence or absence of slavery was a new notion that began to 
evolve in Madison's mind only during the Convention. On the 
other hand, one has to recall that Madison was the original author 
of the three-fifths clause as it was first applied to the revenue 
amendment to the Confederation that the Continental Congress 
proposed in April 1783. His concern with sectional divisions was 
also manifest in the importance that he (and other southern 
leaders) ascribed to the Mississippi River controversy generated 
by the Jay-Gardoqui negotiations.40 
Bilder pays greater attention, however, to a number of other 
issues. Among these, the most important include speeches 
referring to the difficulty of clearly distinguishing the realms of 
national and state legislative authority; the clear relegation of the 
states to a condition in which they would be more akin to 
corporations than sovereign legal authorities; the role of the 
Senate in protecting the rights and interests of a propertied 
minority; the possibility of allowing the executive to serve on good 
3X. Let me be absolutely clear on this. The logic of a Madisonian position involves 
realizing that the existence of a clear sectional division rooted in the presence or absence 
of slavery would remain an underlying source of divergent interests in national politics for 
the foreseeable future. The ostensible quarrel between small and large states would lose 
its importance as soon as the Constitution was adopted, since voters and their 
representatives would rarely if ever again treat the relative size of a stale as a factor 
dictating their political behavior. Cj: RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MFANINCiS, supra note 9, at 92-
94. 
39. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 32. at 3X3; see 
also Drew McCoy, James Madison and Visions of American Nationulity in the 
Confederation Period: A Regional Perspective, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF 
THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 226-5X (Richard Beeman cl 
al. cds., 19X7). 
40. It is worth noting that Madison's first reference to the problem of the factious 
majority, the main concern of Federalist 10, appeared in his letter to Monroe of October 5, 
17X6, as a reflection on the congressional alignment on the Mississippi issue. Letter from 
James Madison to James Monroe (Oct. 5, 17X6), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 
supra note 16, at 141. 
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behavior; and the forthright recognition that slavery deserved 
political recognition through the three-fifths clause. Bilder 
intriguingly wonders whether an oft-cited statement inserted in 
the puzzling June 6 replacement speech actually had its origins in 
1790. "We have seen the mere distinction of colour made in the 
most enlightened period of time, a ground of the most oppressive 
dominion ever exercised by man over man,'' Madison recorded 
himself saying. Bilder not only suggests that this "sentence only 
tenuously related to the speech"; she also notes that the key 
phrase, '"distinction of color,' appeared in the petition from the 
Pennsylvania Abolition Society presented to Congress under 
Benjamin Franklin's signature in February 1790" (pp. 199-200). 
Perhaps Madison "consciously or unconsciously absorbed the 
antislavery rhetoric" of the congressional debates and then 
imported it back into his notes, in his own behalf (p. 200). 
There are many speculations like this in Madison's Hand, and 
not all of them are equally persuasive. One wonders, for example, 
why Madison, writing first and foremost for Jefferson, would want 
to moderate his deprecatory views on the sovereignty of the 
states, when he had initially written Jefferson, back in March 
1787, that he favored a negative on state laws that would apply, to 
use that famously pregnant phrase, "in all cases whatsoever." A 
state subjected to such a restriction would have no claim to 
possess anything resembling sovereignty in any sense of the term. 
One also wonders why Bilder ascribes such significance to the July 
17 speech in which Madison seemed to endorse tenure during 
good behavior for the executive (pp. 114-15, 216--17), when the 
Convention was destined to keep debating that topic over the next 
eight weeks. 
Yet in the final analysis, these kinds of responses or criticisms 
are exactly what Bilder wants to promote. Madison's Hand 
combines bold speculations and provocative arguments with a 
hefty number of cautions and tentative suggestions. It will be left 
to the reader to think about her claims as a continuing challenge 
to any- and I do mean any- analysis that seeks to explain what 
happened at Philadelphia. Anyone who wants to understand or 
explain those deliberations needs to wrestle- and I do mean 
wrestle, too-with Hilder's arguments, not only the big claitns, 
which are controvertible, but also the pointillist ones that focus on 
particular speeches, phrases, and words. Constitutional 
scholarship will never be the same. As Bilder observes in her 
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Introduction, her book is concerned only with the original 
composition and revision of the notes. The third question that will 
concern the rest of us, "how does recognition of the original Notes 
and their revision alter our understanding of the Convention and 
the Constitution?," is a matter she leaves ''largely to the reader'' 
(pp. 4-5). 
One could tentatively offer two answers to that question. 
First, writing and rewriting the history of the origins of the 
Constitution will remain an ongoing project, both because 
Americans retain an inherent interest in that subject, and also 
because our own controversies repeatedly draw us back to 
consider the deep history of particular clauses. As a biographer 
and archeologist of Madison's notes, Bilder has thus reframed 
(and that is the right verb here) a critical element or facet of that 
exercise. But, in the second place, Madison's Hand will arguably 
have a perverse effect on the one form of scholarly inquiry that 
now seems to dominate legal scholarship on the origins of the 
Constitution. I refer, of course, to the originalist project, which 
has taken a profoundly non-historicist, or even anti-historicist, 
turn. Insofar as historians demonstrate that the task of recovering 
the original meaning, intentions, and understandings of the 
Constitution is a complicated and messy project, they encourage 
putative originalists to take a different path, which is now known 
as "semantic" or ''public meaning" originalism. The concluding 
paragraph of a review as lengthy as this one is hardly the place to 
pursue this vexed question. 41 Suffice it to say that Madison's 
Hand, by virtue of elaborating the complexity of the historian's 
quest, will likely fortify the anti-historicist bias of originalism as it 
is currently practiced. How anyone could plausibly discuss the 
original meaning of the Constitution without closely examining 
the intentions of its Framer-authors remains, to my way of 
thinking, a true puzzle, but I am only a working historian- and 
Mary Bilder has just made that work all the more challenging. 
41. For my further thoughts, sec Jack Rakove, Joe the Plou~-:hman Reads the 
Constitution, or, The Poverty of Puhlic Meanin~-: Ori~-:inalism, 4X SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575 
(2011 ); and Jack Rakove, Tone Deaf to the Past: More Qualms Ahout Puhlic Meanin~-: 
Ori~-:inalism, X4 FORDHAM L. REV. t)()l) (2015). The latter essay is a small contrihution to a 
"Forum on Historians and the New Originalism: Contextualism, Historicism, and 
Constitutional Meaning," which, in turn, is a sequel to a much heftier symposium. See 
Symposium on The New Ori~-:inalism in Constitutional Law, X2 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 
(20 13 ). 
